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ABSTRACT
Project Management must use the risk assessment
documents (RADs) as tools to support their decision-
making process. Therefore, these documents have to be
initiated, developed, and evolved parallel to the life of the
project. Technical preparation and safety compliance of
these documents require a great deal of resources.
Updating these documents after-the-fact not only requires
substantial increase in resources - Project Cost -, but this
task is also not useful and perhaps an unnecessary
expense. Hazard Reports (HRs), Failure Modes and
Effects Analysis (FMEAs), Critical Item Lists (CILs),
Risk Management process are, among others, within this
category.
A positive action resulting from a strong partnership
between interested parties is one way to get these
documents and related processes and requirements,
released and updated in useful time. The Space Shuttle
Program (SSP) at the Marshall Space Flight Center has
implemented a process which is having positive results
and gaining acceptance within the Agency. A hybrid
Panel, with equal interest and responsibilities for the two
larger organizations, Safety and Engineering, is the focal
point of this process. Called the Marshall Safety and
Engineering Review Panel (MSERP), itscharter (Space
Shuttle Program Directive 110F, April 15, 2005), and its
Operating Control Plan emphasizes the technical and
safety responsibilities over the program risk documents:
HRs; FMEA/CILs; Engineering Changes;
anomalies/problem resolutions and corrective action
implementations, and trend analysis. The MSERP has
undertaken its responsibilities with objectivity,
assertiveness, dedication, has operated with focus, and has
shown significant results and promising perspectivesl The
MSERP has been deeply involved in propulsion systems
and integration, real time technical issues and other
relevant reviews, since its conception. These activities
have transformed the propulsion MSERP in a truly
participative and value added panel, making a difference
for the safety of the Space Shuttle Vehicle, its crew, and
personnel. Because of the MSERP's valuable
contribution to the assessment of safety risk for the SSP,
this paper also proposes an enhanced Panel concept that
takes this successful partnership concept to a higher level
of 'true partnership'. The proposed panel is aimed to be
responsible for the review and assessment of all risk
relative to Safety for new and future aerospace and related
programs.
1.0 INTRODUCTION
Safety related risk assessment tools and documents have
been developed and proposed to assist the project
manager in the decision-making process. However, due
to several circumstances, some projects opt not to use
them in managing the project or to develop them at a later
date after-the-fact or simply to ignore them. Preparation
and compliance with technical and safety standards and
requirements sometimes require significant resources.
Updating of documents after-the-fact not only requires a
substantial increase in resources - seizing manpower from
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engineeringdisciplinesdoingotheractivities,hiring
contractors,longerandmoreelaboratedreviewing,
approvalprocessing,etc.- impactingdirectlythealready
tightProjectCost,butit isalsonotusefulandperhapsi
anunnecessaryexpense.
2.0RISK ASSESSMENT DOCUMENTS
For file purpose of this paper and without undermining
any other process or document, Project 'risk assessment
documents' (RADs) include:
• Risk management program (RMP).
• Failure Modes and Effect Analysis (FMEA).
• Critical Items List (CIL).
• Hazard Reports (HRs).
• Hardware and Software Discrepancies Reports.
There are few good references to intelligently help in
preparing cacti one of these documents. There are also
few good techniques and many deviations and
interpretations. There are several computer software aids
available for each RAD as well. The purpose of this
paper is not to derive a new or innovative technique or
method. However, in this regard, it is the intent in this
section of the paper to identify and emphasize those key
points which, through the years, have been found
definitely of relevance and significance while processing
these RADs.
2.1. Risk Management
• Prepare with your projects the risk management plan of
the project.
• Identify a 'recovery path' for each risk, with specific
milestones, off ramps and contingency plans. Use any
technique like cascade schedule, etc. Update it monthly,
at least, and use it. Manage your projects with it.
2.2. Failure Modes and Effect Analysis
• Use a logic methodology supported by the
corresponding system/subsystem design team.
• Define with details a failure mode and its effects. The
use of generalized terminology, 'contamination',
'Manufacturing defects', etc, do not provide the
thoroughness of the analysis and allow for specific
activities within the processes and operations to be
overlooked.
2.3. Critical Items List
• Derive the CIL from the FMEA or similar analysis. Do
not use 'precious experiences' or brainstorming for
identification of causes to be part of the CIL.
• In the retention rationale, provide controls for each
requirement and verification methods for each control.
2.4. Hazard Reports
• Start with the Fault Tree Analysis (FTA). Identify the
highest potential catastrophic event for all your projects
within a Program, and always develop from there down to
the level where the controls are applied.
• Define at which level your FTA stops and provide for
each cause, requirements, controls and verification
methods. For each control, provide corresponding
verification methods (analysis, test, inspection) with the
corresponding acceptable reference.
2.5. RADs MUST HAVE:
• Consistency: same guidelines to all contractors. Same
philosophy, same level of detail. The product may not be
the same, but your directions and technical depth ness will
be consistent.
• Enforce them. Assign a responsible individual at the
level required i.e.: one person for HR; or one person for
the whole FMEA; or a team for the RMP of a projects,
etc.
• MakeRADsdeliveriesontime.Updatethemasthe
projectmaturesinsuchawaythattheybecomer levant
toolsinthedecision-makingprocess.
• RADsaretoolstobeusedinadailybasisby
management(programanagement;projectmanagement;
lineorganizations).
°RADsmustbetheresponsibilityoftheProjecti self,
althoughpreparationa dimplementationsthe
responsibilityoftheprojectthroughthelineorganizations
andtheChiefEngineersorSystemEngineers.Therefore,
it isofamutualinteresttohaveRADsidentified,
developedandreviewedwiththemilestoneoftheproject
{SystemRequirementsReview(SRR),Preliminary
DesignReview(PDR),CriticalDesignReview(CDR),
etc}. Anindependenttitywithadequatesupporting
backgroundantiknowledgeshouldbeassignedtoassess,
monitoranddispositionRADs,shouldertoshoulderwith
theprogressoftheproject.AnindependentPanelof
expertsi therightapproach,aslongasthePaneloperates
throughthedurationoftheproject,fromconceptionto
closureordisposal.AssessmentofRADsafter-the-factis
notasuseful.Inaddition,theselaterassessmentsusually
requirea largeramountofresourcesthanif theyhadbeen
developedandreviewedwiththeprogressoftheproject.
3.0.SAFETYPANEL
3.1. Background
Now, relative to the assessment of safety risk, let's look at
histoI2€ and specifically talk about the Space Shuttle
Program (SSP)_ Since early stages, efforts have been
made to maintain and establish an official Senior Panel:
"'... A Senior Safety Board as a mechanism to periodic
review of system and element level hazard resolution
activities and for providing management visibility of open
and accepted risk hazards" (January 15, 1981) [1]. At
that time, the charter was prepared for a centralized
Board, assigning the Board activities under the
responsibility of the Johnson Space Center (JSC) Director
of Safety Reliability and quality assurance and charter to
concentrate its efforts in the review of Space Shuttle
Integration, cargo Integration, and Element-level open
hazards, and establish actions for hazard resolution, and
review and approve of hazard closure rationale. In
addition, it was defined as part of the policy that each one
of the Board members was responsible for identifying
hazards to the Board for their areas of responsibility.
In the following years the charter of the Board was
confirmed with minor modifications, such as, addition of
interaction and participation of other Agencies (i.e.: Air
Force) [2], [3], [4].
After the Challenger accident on January 28, 1986, the
National Space Transportation System Safety Review
Panel (SSRP) was then established on December 08,
1988. [5], "...as a mechanism of enhancing the Space
Transportation System Safety Management and
Engineering through informational interchanges,
development of concepts to improve the STS Safety
Program, review of safety documentation, review of STS
integration and cargo integration, review of STS element-
level hazard identification and resolution activities, and
recommendations to level H management for Hazards
report disposition." Later (February 2, 2000), in an effort
to cover more ground relative to the SSP Safety Risk
products, the scope of the SSRP was stretched: "This
scope includes all Space Shuttle flight and ground
processing Hazards and critical failure modes that can
affect program Safety risk and have criticality 1, 1S, 1R,
• 2, 2R impact on the Space Shuttle including government
furnished equipment." [6].
Although the intent was right, now including the CILs and
the ground and processing equipment and operations, it
was resource and time intensive. In addition, at this time
the SSRP was chartered to "... establish and execute risk
management techniques to provide identification and
resolutionofpotentialprogramrisks..." [6], which
require additional concentration, dedication and research
of individual design, manufacturing, testing, and
operations and processes at each Center. Certainly, to
properly review Hazard Reports plus CILs plus coming
up wiLth innovative risk management strategies and
policies for the SSP, more than the SSRP was required.
The scope, as defined in the charter, was intentionally
right but perhaps too ambitious for the resources
allocated.
3.2. Safety Engineering Review Panel (SERP)
Post-Columbia evaluations of Shuttle Program [7}
concluded that the existing SSRP function/operation was
deficient in providing Program Management with proper
insight into program risk. Subsequently, Shuttle Program
S&MA Office concluded the following: 1. The Safety
Panel should become as pr0active as possible without
losing independence. 2. Program/project managers must
accept all risk. 3. Decrease scope to increase involvement
in project decision-making. 4. Engineering should
actiw_ly participate in the Safety Review Process.
In order to make the Safety Panel more effective and
focused, the SSP approved the establishment of the Safety
Engineering Review Panel (SERP) [8], on April 15, 2005,
in lieu of the SSRP. The SERP, really, is an organization
of Panels structured as the SSP is (see Fig. 1). One Panel
at each Space Center (JSC, KSC, and MSFC), which
constitutes the Level 3 and one management Panel at the
LevelL2. In addition, an Integration Safety Engineering
Review Panel (ISERP) resides at the Level 2 and is
responsible for the review of integrated HRs and serves to
technically integrate safety products across the program
elements.
It was intended to have the SERP as an independent
advisor to program and project management for the
acceptance of risk. Now its scope emphasizes in
reviewing and approving SSP Hazard Reports (HRs) and
Critical Item Lists (CILs) based on adequacy of safety
analysis, compliance to program requirements, and
assessment of risk, of each element or operations by a
Center. In addition, a few more tasks were added to the
scope which now reaches to perform the assessment of
risk to support the project milestones (SRR, PRR, CDR,
etc), the assessment of engineering and project changes
that may affect HRs and CILs, and 'Problem Report and
Corrective Action' (PRACA) having associated criticality
ofl and 1R.
3.3. The Marshall SERP
At the MSFC the SERP concept was very well adopted
and immediately implemented. The scope and
responsibilities were summarized in a flow diagram (see
Fig. 2), to be applied to the MSFC Shuttle Propulsion
Elements: External Tank (ET), Redesigned Solid Rocket
Motor (RSRM), Solid Rocket Booster (SRB), and Space
Shuttle Main Engine (SSME). An innovative approach
was taken to enhance the ED participation in the MSERP.
The two line organizations ED and S&MA agreed upon
the approach giving ED additional participation in the
Panel.' First of all, the Panel is titled, 'Marshall Safety
AND Engineering Review Panel'. Notice the sense of
partnership and the level of responsibility bringing the
two organizations together in one entity. The ED Senior
Rep is the Focal point for engineering needs and he/she is
given the title of Co-Chair, having the MSERP Chair
from within S&MA, since the Panel directly responds to
S&MA upper management. The ED Senior rep is
responsible for managing the ED participation and
technical expertise required to adequately support the
Panel review meetings, technical interchange meetings
(TIMs), and safety issue briefing reviews. Also, ED is
committed to provide professional expertise required to
support MSERP meetings with the Projects and Prime
System Safety Review Panel C, arter
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contractors, and any other MSERP activity, as required.
ED has agreed to assign ED responsible individuals for
the HRs and CILs for each Propulsion Element. The
Element Chief Engineers have taken this responsibility.
The MSERP has shown, since the SERP implementation,
stronger participation in risk assessment and more in-
depth analysis and accomplishment of the charter tasks.
Its organization and structure has allowed it to penetrate
into the current issues and also update those activities that
were behind, as far as risk assessment is concerned.
MSERP has adopted a database within the MSFC Process
Base Mission Assurance (PBMA) system where
schedules, meeting minutes, technical and other support
presentations, action items and agreements, and closures
are stored and available. Any additional MSERP
statistical information is stored and available in PBMA
and as well as the current issues of required documents
(standards, Spec's, requirements, etc.).
In order to dedicate adequate time with all Propulsion
Elements, the MSERP schedules monthly meetings, ahead
of time, with each one of them. Additional meetings are
available as requested. Also, face-to-face meetings at the
Contractor's site are held at least once a year. Continuous
formal or informal communication is encouraged between
the MSERP members and all parties involved in the risk
assessment process. Once a week the MSERP meets to
review internal matters, establish priorities, and set
strategies.
3.3.1. MSERP Membership
PRIIVlARY PANEL MEMBERS:
Chairperson - from MSFC S&MA
Engineering Directorate Rep - from ED MSFC
Executive Secretary - from MSFC S&MA
Integration Rep - from MSFC S&MA
PSE&I Rep - from MSFC
Astronaut Office
Mission Ops from JSC (as needed)
ADVISORY PANEL MEMBERS:
Project Office Representative
Project/element S&MA Representative
Prime Contractors
KSC Launch/Landing Project Office (as needed)
Reliability/Maintainability for CIL reviews
4.0 PROPOSED PANEL
4.1. The MSERP has accomplished successful goals and
achievements and its performance will continue
improving towards stronger contribution to the Space
Shuttle safety and mission success.
One step forward - beyond those already made by the
MSERP -is proposed in this paper to be considered for
future and relatively new aerospace and related programs
and projects.
The same team that has the background and the trained
expertise in this matter must assess any safety concern,
issue or risk. With the right team, the right structure, and
the required level of expertise, the proposed Panel must
be able to accommodate any safety risk assessment within
the project. In addition, it would be an independent expert
assessment to the benefit of the project manager, as well.
This Panel must assure on-time delivery of those RADs
and other engineering and project changes, PRACA
items, risk management progress, etc., to adequately
support the project milestones.
On the other hand, since the risk associated with safety
has origins and roots at any point during the life of the
project - concept, design, manufacturing, test, operations
and flight, recovery, etc. - it is proposed that the safety
panel be a true partnership between those organizations
involved in the process. Since in some projects there are
numerous organizations to be represented in a workable
Panel, just select the most significant (three or so) to be
represented as members of the Panel. However, when
theterm'true partnership' is used, it means: same level of
responsibility and accountability, same level of authority,
same level of representation and support, and same level
of rights and prerogatives. A true partnership and an
independent entity do not have to have ownership in one
single organization: it has to be equally and strongly
supported by those key organizations that are
participating in the safety review process. Sure, it has to
be a Chair and a Co-Chair, and it has to operate as a
Panel. However, they do not have to be from within
S&MA necessarily. Furthermore, as an independent
entity it must have its own budget, funded by the Program
and it can have dotted line responsibilities to those
orgar6zations (ED, S&MA, Operations, etc) that equally
support the Panel. Also, there will be in the Panel some
representatives supporting only certain tasks, not as
permanent members.
4.2. lit is desirable and perhaps advantageous that, from
the start to the end of a task or project, safety risk
associated with its design, manufacturing, test, flight, etc.,
of a sub-system, system, etc. be assessed by the same
entity of risk experts - same entity does not necessarily
means same individuals. It provides consistency,
continuity, and better utilization of the expertise gained
through the process. Furthermore, while tasks required to
control or eliminate risk are performed by individuals
from the engineering, safety, operations or science
organizations, the analysis and assessment of safety risk
is preferable to be a joined effort of experts who have
gained knowledge of the system and acquired expertise,
working as an entity. The risk coming from the project
risk management process has to be handled with the same
philosophy and similar strategy than any other safety risk.
So when safety risk is at stake, it must be understood that
it is intended to be relevant to any safety risk originated
from any source. So, the safety risk associated with the
HRs, CILs, Engineering and project changes, and PRACA
items, and that risk associated with the risk management
process of a project and any other source, must be treated
equally and reviewed and assessed by the same Panel.
For all of the above, while the scope of the SERP is well
accepted, it is proposed to create a Panel whose scope
includes not only the SERP's but also the task of
assessing all safety risks including those from the risk
management process of the project and any other source.
It will also allow for consistency in safety risk analysis,
disposition of risks and risk ranking.
5.0. Conclusions
5.1. RADs must be implemented at the early stages
(rather than at the beginning) of a project and must be
used as tools in management decision-making. Otherwise,
it is advised to utilize those allocated resources in other
relevant project activities.
5.2. It is advisable that the safety risk within a project be
assessed and reviewed by an independent entity or Panel.
5.3. The MSERP believes in its objective and has
undertaken its charter with professionalism, commitment,
and accountability.
5.4. The 'True partnership' Panel concept can be applied
to any specific task within the project, not solely to Safety
risk assessment.
6.0 Recommendations
6.1. The SERP concept for the SSP was a step in the right
direction, as far as management of safety risk. This
concept must be considered for relatively new and future
aerospace and related programs.
6. 2. A well structured 'True Partnership' Safety Panel
has been proposed to enhance the performance,
responsibility, and accountability of the key organizations
participating in the assessment of the project risk
associated with safety.
6.3.ThisPanelshallassessandreviewsafetyriskcoming
fromrelatedprocesses,documents(RADs),andproject
changes.
6.4.A 'TruepartnershipSafetyPanel',asanindependent
entity,mustbeequallysupportedbythekeyorganizations
represented.Thoseorganizationshavesamelevelof
responsibilityandaccountabilityasthePanelitself.
6.5.The'TruePartnershipPanel'mustrespondtothekey
organizationsrepresentedinthePanelandatthesame
levelofmanagement.Itmustalsohaveitsownbudget
fundedbytheProgram.
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